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ABSTRACT
In this essay, I argue that contractualism, even when it is actually
used to construe our moral duties towards non-human animals, does
not do so naturally. We can infer from our experiences with companion animals that we owe moral duties towards them because of
special relationships we are in with them. We can further abstract
that we owe general moral duties to non-human animals because
they are the kinds of beings that we can have relationships with, and
because of the capacities that make possible this relational capacity.
This type of approach better explains our duties towards non-human
animals and other non-rational beings than does the trustee account
that Scanlon leaves room for in his contractualism. This relational
account of moral duty will only apply to non-human animals with the
requisite capacities, but this includes common companion animals.
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Introduction
In this paper, I will evaluate T.M. Scanlon’s account of the
scope of morality in his version of contractualism. I will argue
that Scanlon’s own view of whom we owe moral duties to is
too narrow, wrongly excluding non-human animals. Moreover,
his trustee account, both in the case of non-human animals (if
applied to them), and of humans who lack judgment-sensitive
attitudes, is not the most plausible account of our moral duties
to them in themselves. I will develop an account according to
which we owe moral duties to non-rational beings because of
relationships we have with them, the capacity they have to form
relationships, and the capacities that undergird the capacity to
form relationships.

Scanlon’s Account of Moral Duty
Scanlon’s account of the scope of morality is focused on
what is required for a being to be the kind of thing which can
be wronged (Scanlon 1998, 179).We can wrong others if they
are the type of beings to which it makes sense for us to justify ourselves. The general form of this justification is that we
treat such beings “…only in ways that would be allowed by
principles that they could not reasonably reject insofar as they,
too, were seeking principles of mutual governance which other
rational creatures could not reasonably reject” (Scanlon 1998,
106).
Violating the formula here is not meant to be the only way
in which one can do something morally wrong. This is because
there is moral wrongness in the broad sense in which “…some
form of conduct is open to a serious moral objection of some
kind” (Scanlon 1998, 178). One important way in which a thing
can be wrong in the broad sense is if it unjustifiably causes a
sentient being to experience pain (Scanlon 1998, 181). In caus-
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ing a sentient being pain, we have done something which we
have prima facie reason not to do, because pain is bad. Scanlon’s view, however, is that in doing something wrong in this
broad sense, we have not wronged a being itself. We have not
violated a duty we owe to that being qua other.
Sentience, i.e. the ability to experience pain and pleasure, is
not a sufficient condition for owing a moral duty to a being in
itself, because the being that merely has sentience does not have
“judgment-sensitive attitudes” (Scanlon 1998, 180). Judgmentsensitive attitudes are defined as attitudes that it makes sense to
offer or require justificatory reasons for having (Scanlon 1998,
20). Paradigm cases of such attitudes seem to be beliefs and
intentions to act in certain ways, but Scanlon also includes attitudes such as hopes and fears under the umbrella. A being
without judgment-sensitive attitudes is not the kind of thing to
which it makes sense for us to have to justify ourselves, so we
cannot wrong it in itself.

Non-human Animals
A crucial question for Scanlon’s account of moral wrongness, in the strict sense of what we owe to others qua other, is
whether or not non-human animals are owed duties in themselves. Intuitively, it seems that we do owe duties to non-human
animals. As Scanlon acknowledges, in the case of torturing a
non-human animal it “…may seem wrong in a sense that goes
beyond the idea that pain is a bad thing: it is something for
which we should feel guilty to the animal itself, just as we can
feel guilt to a human being” (Scanlon 1998, 182). Reasons for
feeling this way in the case of companion animals include capacities we attribute to them for “…mutual expectation, reciprocated affection, and emotions such as disappointment, anger,
and even resentment” (Scanlon 1998, 182). Such capacities, as
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Scanlon acknowledges, seem much more sophisticated than
mere sentience.
Given such considerations, Scanlon allows that his contractualism can account for duties we owe to non-human animals
themselves, if we choose to utilize it in this way. This allowance posits a trustee account, according to which non-human
animals are represented by trustees who can stand in their
place and judge principles for them (Scanlon 1998, 183). If the
trustees can reasonably reject principles that endorse certain
treatment of non-human animals, then those principles are to
be rejected.
Although Scanlon allows that such an extension of his account is consistent with it, he himself does not endorse it.
Rather, he thinks we can account for our required treatment of
non-human animals in the broader sense of the moral wrongness of pain (Scanlon 1998, 184). As a result, the reasons that
non-human animals provide us with are impersonal rather than
personal reasons (Scanlon 1998, 219). Non-human animals are
sentient, and thus valuable, so it is wrong in the general sense
that we cause them pain. But the value of non-human animals
does not directly affect the moral duties we owe to others. Nonhuman animals are not themselves a locus to which we can
owe moral duties, so the only way their value can affect moral
duties to others is indirect. For example, if someone wants to
live in a way that respects the impersonal value of non-human
animals, say, by not letting them suffer when they can be aided,
then this person can reasonably reject principles that would require not taking this impersonal value into account (Scanlon
1998, 221). It is denied, however, that we can reasonably reject principles that permit one to fail to take into account the
value of non-human animals (and other impersonally valuable
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things). This caveat is presumably meant to protect one’s liberty of conscience. There are other types of impersonally valuable things, such as the Grand Canyon, which, it would seem,
we ought not be required to treat as valuable in our lives, at
least insofar as our disregard for its value does not involve our
depriving others of valuable ways of living, such as by destroying the Grand Canyon, thus depriving others of the ability to
experience its grandeur.
There seem to be two reasons for supposing we do not
owe moral duties to non-human animals. First, the trustee account itself appeals exclusively to the rejection of principles
that cause non-human animals pain, which makes the practical difference between the broader and stricter sense of moral
wrongness very minimal, and thus unnecessary. Secondly, the
moral status of humans is significantly different than that of
non-human animals, even in the case of infants, children, and
the disabled (Scanlon 1998, 185).
The second reason requires a bit of explanation. Human beings generally have the capacity to form judgement-sensitive
attitudes. To better understand why it is denied that we owe
duties to non-human animals, it will help to better understand
what judgment-sensitive attitudes are, or at least what Scanlon
has in mind when using the term. To this end, it is helpful to
consider Alasdair MacIntyre’s discussion of “reasons for action” (MacIntyre 1999, 53-61). Against the rather implausible
view that non-human animals cannot have reasons because
giving reasons is necessary for having reasons, and giving reasons requires the possession of a language, MacIntyre, following Aquinas, argues that non-human animals do have reasons.
According to MacIntyre:
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Nonhuman animals are, he [Aquinas] allowed, “moved
by precepts” and on occasion learn from past experience to recognize this or that as a friendly or hostile. In
virtue of their nature and of such capacity for learning
as they have, they are able to make what Aquinas calls
“natural judgments.” So they do exhibit what Aquinas
calls “a semblance of reason” and “they share in” what
he calls “natural prudence” (MacIntyre 1999, 55).
Non-human animals do have reasons that guide their actions. But, according to MacIntyre, humans have the further
rational capacity of being able to reflect upon their reasons for
action and make judgments about them. In order for one to
have judgment-sensitive attitudes in Scanlon’s sense, the claim
seems to be that the further rational capacity of reflecting upon
one’s reasons is necessary. If a being cannot reflect upon its
reasons for action, then it makes no sense to require them to
justify their reasons for action, or to justify our reasons for
actions to them. Because we cannot justify ourselves to nonhuman animals, or require justification from them, we do not
owe justification to them, nor they to us. Because we do not
owe justification to them, we do not owe moral duties to them.
Infants, young children, and the disabled do not have this
capacity. Infants and young children, however, will normally
development such a capacity, and thus are said to not be “separate kinds of creatures” from adults who currently have this
capacity (Scanlon 1998, 185). The case of the disabled, particularly those who never develop the capacity for having
judgment-sensitive attitudes, may seem a bit trickier. Scanlon,
however, thinks that we “clearly do” have reason to treat the
severely disabled as his account requires for others who are
merely biologically human (Scanlon 1998, 185). The reason is
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that such beings are born to humans. The relation of being born
to humans is said to provide a strong reason for applying the
trustee account to such humans, even if the trustee account
does not apply to non-human animals. Counterfactually, such
humans would be able to reasonably reject certain principles,
so they have the moral status required for being owed duties
in themselves. The idea seems to be that, since the severely
disabled are born human, they would have normally been the
types of beings which would have developed the requisite faculties, even though that is not how it turned out. Non-human
animals, however, do not normally develop such faculties, so
they are denied such robust moral status. Being biologically
human thus suffices for being owed moral duties, a fact that is
denied as being a case of the prejudice known as speciesism.
If, however, being biologically human, i.e. being a member of
the human species, suffices for being owed moral duties, quite
apart from one’s actual or future capacities, then I agree with
Matthew Talbert that Scanlon’s denial of speciesism falls flat
(Talbert 2006, 210).

Companion Animals and Relationships
Scanlon himself provides some of the material for believing he is mistaken about denying moral duties to non-human
animals in the discussion of companion animals. As was mentioned above, we generally take companion animals to be capable of reciprocal affection, expectation, and rich emotions such
as disappointment, anger, sadness, etc. These capacities are relational capacities, i.e. those that make it possible for us to have
rich relationships with non-human animals. In attributing these
capacities to non-human animals, experience seems clearly to
affirm that we are correct. When the human of a companion
animal is in pain or perceivably harassed or assaulted by another person, it is known through experience that, say, a dog,
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can rush to its human in order to comfort them, or attack or
bark at the assailant. No doubt this has to do with the fact that
the human has shown affection to the dog over the years in petting them, providing food and shelter, and playing with them.
A bond has been formed that influences how both the dog and
the human behave.
If the human were, say, to kick the dog in the teeth, this action will seem to violate a duty to the dog not merely because
it will cause the dog pain, but because it will violate the relationship that has been formed. The trustee can thus reject principles that would endorse or allow the violation of the relationship of reciprocal affection and mutual expectation between
the dog and its owner. Such an explanation, moreover, seems to
not only apply in the case of direct harms such as striking one’s
companion animal, but also in the case of failures to aid them.
Those who have had dogs in their family know that they
can ask us to do things for them. Dogs can know where the
leash is kept, and can gesture in the direction of the leash, and
then look back at the owner. The action indicates a desire to go
for a walk. This is also done when the dog knows where their
canned food or other treats are. It is also well known that dogs
will whine to be let outside, or to be petted. In doing these
things, the dog is requesting something of their owner with
the expectation that the request will be fulfilled. If the owner
fails to fulfill such requests, especially without good reason,
then they will plausibly have wronged the dog because of the
established relationship, not merely because it will foreclose
on the dog’s experience of pleasure, or cause distress. Moral
principles that endorse or allow such neglect will be rejected
by the trustees of dogs.
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Scanlon provides us with a way of knowing this to be the
case. Scanlon posits what he calls a remorse test which we can
use to show us to whom we owe moral duties and in what way
we owe them (Scanlon 2017, 15-16). In the case of humans,
when we wrong them, we feel a kind of remorse over the fact
that “…an individual who is affected by our action has a reason for objecting to it that cannot be answered satisfactorily”
(Scanlon 2017, 16). In the case of companion animals, many
of us have a feeling of remorse when we harm or neglect them
that indicates to us that we have wronged them. For example,
when I am in a bad mood and yell at my dog over a trivial
matter, I feel that I have wronged her, and try to make it up to
her through petting or a treat. The feeling of remorse in this
case can perhaps, to some people, be neutral over the question of owing duties to our companion animals, and thus not be
necessarily tied to a trustee account. But the feeling of having
wronged our beloved companion animals in themselves rather
than in a general, detached way, is potent evidence to us that
we do in fact owe duties to them.
It will, of course, be objected to my use of the remorse test
that not everyone feels this way when they yell at their companion animals, or otherwise violate their relationships with them.
I do have an error theory here. In my view, when humans do
not feel that they owe moral duties to their companion animals
(or non-human animals more generally, as will be made clear
later), it is because of anthropocentric cultural biases that have
influenced them, either in their generally unreflective moral
judgments, or in their reflective acceptance of an account of
morality that denies moral duties to non-human animals. These
are biases that should in fact be rejected.
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Violations of the relationships we have with non-human
animals do in fact provoke experiences of disappointment,
betrayal, or sadness in them. We can, for example, see dogs
sulking around. Such capacities are far more sophisticated than
merely having the ability to experience pain. This is why we
are capable of forming relationships with non-human animals
that are obligating of us. I do not want to deny, however, that
sentience itself is an important capacity that, combined with
an undefined number of other capacities, allows us to form relationships with non-human animals. Nor do I want to deny
that sentience is enough to impose moral duties on us towards
non-human animals.
In fact, I agree with Christine Korsgaard that in having in
common with non-human animals the state of being a conscious animal, we have in common being someone with them
(Korsgaard 1996, 153). Moreover, Korsgaard is quite right that
in experiencing physical pain, non-human animals perceive a
reason for action to relieve that pain (a threat to their physical
identity), and the recognition of this pain causes further emotional pain, and these give rise to cries (and other behaviors)
from which we perceive such reasons. As Korsgaard says, we
perceive the reasons in these cries through pity, and they impose moral duties on us to the animals themselves to relieve
this pain. I think what Korsgaard says here is similar to an
adoption of Scanlon’s remorse test. If we failed to aid non-human animals in pain, we would experience remorse that indicates moral duties towards them that have been violated. It is
not clear, however, that sentience in this sense (combined with
the ability to express distress) occurs divorced from other capacities that jointly make non-human animals capable of having rich relationships with us. If it did, perhaps it would still be
enough to impose moral duties on us towards them. So, even if
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Scanlon were correct about pain being the only type of thing
the experience of which trustees could object to in rejecting
principles in the stead of non-human animals, it seems that the
trustee account would still be preferable over construing the
moral status of non-human animals in the broad sense.
An excellent point that Talbert makes about Scanlon’s contractualism is that the broader theory is like the trustee account
in that it involves positing a type of ideal rationality in other
normal adult humans that they may not have, essentially treating them as their own trustees (Talbert 2006, 212-213). Scanlon’s theory does not depend on humans actually reasonably
rejecting the principles of our actions for them to be wrong.
Rather, we think about which principles they could in fact reasonably reject if they were sufficiently thoughtful. This means
that contractualism is not generally based on the actual exercise of judgment-sensitive attitudes, but being aware of the interests that others have from their own viewpoint. Talbert takes
this as further reason to construe non-human animals as being
included within those to whom we owe moral duties, because,
like Korsgaard says, they do have interests. I agree with Talbert that it is arbitrary to use the trustee account specifically,
or contractualism more generally, to account for the moral duties we owe to humans, but deny such duties to nonhuman animals. I will further argue, however, that contractualism does
not adequately account for many of our moral duties to nonrational beings, so we have to go beyond it. The capacities that
the trustee account would have to take into consideration are
tied instead, in many cases, into my hierarchical, relational account of moral duty.
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Non-human Animals More Generally
Given the discussion of capacities to form relationships with
us that non-human animals have, we should go further and
say that it is not only an actually established relationship we
have with non-human animals that imposes moral duties on
us towards them. Rather, the capacities that give non-human
animals the capacity to form relationships, and this further capacity itself, impose moral duties on us to treat non-human animals in certain ways. This allows us to extend duties we owe to
non-human animals beyond those owed to companion animals.
Indeed, it would seem rather arbitrary to say our companion
animals are owed duties, whereas others just like them but not
in such relationships are not owed duties.
Scanlon’s own discussion of friendship can help us see one
reason why it is problematic to afford moral duties to our companion animals but not to non-human animals with similar capacities that the former have. Scanlon considers the case of a
friend who is willing to steal a kidney from another person
in order to aid you (Scanlon 1998, 164-165). In such a case,
the victim of the theft is the same type of being which you
yourself are, but your friend is willing to treat them in ways
that you yourself would not want to be treated as that type of
being. This shows that your friend does not afford moral status
to you for what you are, but only because “he happens to like
you” (Scanlon 1998, 165). If you were to lose favor in the sight
of your friend, he might just as easily do whatever he wants to
you, which seems to imply a fundamental lack of respect for
you. The case seems parallel to that of companion animals,
a relationship which is very much like friendship with other
humans.
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We generally treat dogs well (at least in many parts of the
world), but animals such as pigs, who are commonly thought to
be of comparable, perhaps even greater intelligence than dogs,
exist, for the most part, only to be preyed upon by us in our
societies. We even feed pigs to our dogs in food and chew toys.
Pigs could just as easily have been our companion animals (and
sometimes are) if history had unfolded differently, and dogs
could be our food (as they are in some parts of the world). Our
historically contingent different treatment of these two types
of non-human animals seems very arbitrary from a moral point
of view. It seems at face value to indicate that we value dogs
because we happen to like them, but not because they are the
kinds of beings capable of having these types of relationships
with us. Dogs themselves are unaware of this fact, but we can
be aware of it.
I do not think that this is quite correct. I think our relationships with dogs (and other companion animals) allow us to
recognize, at least implicitly, that the kinds of capacities that
they have afford them moral status in a more than broad sense.
I think the problem is that we do not reflect on this fact sufficiently enough, and thus fail to extend our moral duties to
other animals with similar capacities. We thus practically treat
our companion animals in ways that Scanlon’s organ-stealing
friend treats us, but on reflection, we would, I hope, be more
likely to change our behavior. In so doing we will treat all nonhuman animals with the requisite relational capacities in ways
that they deserve, including even our own companion animals,
whom we often love like human members of our families.

Impersonal Reasons Revisited
Another objection to Scanlon’s view of the moral status of
non-human animals lies in his discussion, mentioned above, of
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impersonal and personal reasons. Since Scanlon does not favor
the trustee account, but rather the approach of construing the
moral status of non-human animals in the broader sense, they
only give us impersonal reasons. This means that the reasons
non-human animals give us cannot directly allow us to reject
principles. A very troubling, implausible consequence of this
view is that it puts non-human animals in the same general
moral category as inanimate objects like the Grand Canyon,
forests, or monuments. To be sure, non-human animals could
still be said to be more valuable than such things, but their value is still the source of the same general, impersonal type of
reason.
It seems, however, that because non-human animals are so
different from inanimate objects, they should not be construed
as giving the same general type of reason. This is particularly
poignant when considering the fact that Scanlon does not allow
the rejection of principles on the grounds that they permit us
to fail to regard or treat as valuable that which is valuable. It
is implausible that we do not owe it to each other to treat nonhuman animals well, because, as Korsgaard’s remarks indicate,
non-human animals themselves are part of the “each other.”
They are “someone,” not merely fixtures of our environment.
Scanlon’s discussion of personal and impersonal reasons does
not honor this fact.

Infants, Children, and the Disabled
Now consider Scanlon’s treatment of infants, children, and
the severely disabled. As indicated, the account of our duties to
such humans is essentially that they belong to a species, members of which normally develop judgment-sensitive attitudes,
even though they may in fact lack this. Because of their membership in this species, the trustee account is to be applied to
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them. But is this species-membership plausibly why we do in
fact owe duties to such beings? I think not. If, for example, I
have a mentally challenged son, and he comes up to me, gesturing that I make him a sandwich, the primary reasons why I
should refrain from hitting him in the face in response, or simply ignoring him, do not seem much different than the case of
non-human animals. I have an obligating relationship with him
to refrain from harming him, and to actually aid him, and the
fact that he is capable of being in such a relationship with me,
seems to ground my moral duties towards him in himself. The
consideration that he belongs to a species that normally develops judgment-sensitive attitudes, even though he lacks them,
seems rather weak. If it is acknowledged that such considerations as I have suggested apply in this case do in fact apply,
then it is incredibly arbitrary to deny that they also apply in the
case of non-human animals. So, the primary reasons we have
to think we have moral duties to the disabled and children seem
to also be reasons to think the same of non-human animals.

Is There Room for the Trustee Account and
Contractualism Generally?
Another point is that, at least in many cases, the trustee account itself seems superfluous to add for those particular cases. It seems plausible that we do not need to appeal to principles
trustees for non-human animals, children, or the severely disabled would reasonably reject in order to account for many of
our moral duties towards such beings, nor does such an account naturally provide such grounds. Rather, relationships,
the capacity to form relationships, and the capacities that undergird this capacity, seem to be what imposes moral duties on
us towards these beings in themselves. It may be objected here
that in focusing on the continuity between non-human animals
and humans my account fails to take into consideration the
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real differences between the two. The fact that we may justify
ourselves to one another adds a dimension of moral obligation
not present in the case of non-human animals (Ashford and
Mulgan, 2018). My account is consistent with this objection,
so long as we do not make the distinction too sharp. It seems
that non-human animals are the kinds of beings to whom we
owe moral duties, and the ways in which we do seem to be the
primary ways we have moral duties to infants, children, and
the severely disabled as well. Scanlon’s contractualism affords
moral status in the narrow sense of what we owe to each other
to all of these beings in a rather farfetched, weak way.
Should the same be said of the moral duties we have to humans more generally? No, I think contractualism does in fact
have a legitimate contribution to make in the case of normal
adult humans. As Scanlon points out, we do not generally think
that it is problematic to interfere in the goal-directed activity
of non-human animals, unless some further morally objectionable action is thus committed in doing this (Scanlon 1998, 184).
Non-human animals, lacking robust rationality, may legitimately have their behavior altered by us for their greater good,
such as through training them not to run in the road. Moreover,
we can do things such as put heart-worm medication in their
food, or have them spayed or neutered, without their knowledge or consent, and not be morally blameworthy for this. In
the case of normal adult humans, if we kidnapped them and
had them spayed or neutered, or put medication in their food
without their consent, we would have committed actions which
act according to principles that could reasonably be rejected.
Normal adult humans may reasonably reject principles that allow their own wills to be manipulated or completely ignored.
Accepting Talbert’s construal of contractualism more generally as being akin to the trustee model, we can say here that
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normal adult humans have different “needs and interests” than
nonhuman animals and other humans, i.e. to not be manipulated or treated unduly paternalistically ( Talbert 2006, 213).
This discussion leaves room for the possibility that contractualism, while not necessary or natural for construing many of
the moral duties we owe to non-rational beings, could be used
for other duties towards them. Such duties are paternalistic duties. We have duties to perform actions that are for the greater
good of non-rational beings, especially when in relationships
with them. In the case of infants and children, for example, we
have to teach and shape them with an eye towards what they
will become. Since they will become members of the moral
community, the ways in which we shape them can plausibly be
required to pass the test of not being tied to principles that can
reasonably be rejected by members of the moral community.
For example, a principle that allows us to teach our children to
be racists can be reasonably rejected because, as future members of the moral community, they have a stake in becoming
morally good rather than morally vicious people.

Moral Pluralism
As is clear in the preceding discussion, Scanlon himself
views morality, and moral wrongness itself, in a pluralistic way.
There are things which are wrong in the broad sense of being
subject to serious moral objection, and things which wrong beings themselves which are “others” to whom we owe moral duties. My account further splits moral wrongness in the latter
sense. We owe moral duties to non-human animals and other
non-rational beings because of the relationships we have with
them, their capacities for these relationships, and the capacities
that undergird such capacities for relationships. This way of
construing moral duty will also apply to rational beings insofar
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as they have in common relational capacities with non-rational
beings. There is a further grounds for moral duty that contractualism may provide in the case of members of the rational,
moral community, as well as the case of future members of the
moral community. The latter way of construing moral duties is
not in itself good enough to naturally account for all moral duties we owe to others, even when its advocates want to try to do
this. The resulting picture is less parsimonious than Scanlon’s
own account, but as he himself rightly says, “It would be a
mistake to ignore judgments that we in fact take to be relevant
just for the sake of greater neatness in our thinking” (Scanlon
1998, 99).

The Nature of Relationships and Capacities
Throughout the paper I have discussed relationships, the capacity for relationships, and the capacities that undergird the
capacity for relationships that impose moral duties upon us.
In this section, I will clarify these concepts. First, by relationships, I have in mind what Shelly Kagan calls a special relationship that imposes upon us a special obligation (Kagan
1998, 126). In taking a non-human animal into our care, we
voluntarily accept a special obligation that does not apply to
others who do not have this particular relationship with our
particular companion animal. As time goes on, the relationship between human and companion animal deepens through
shared experiences and affection, making transgressions of the
relationship seem more heinous. The companion animal learns
to depend upon their human for food, security, play, and affection. They become distressed when their human leaves the
home, especially for prolonged periods, and display clear signs
of excitement, such as jumping in the air and running around
the house when their human returns. This reciprocal affection
is similar to that between humans and other humans.
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The capacity to form relationships depends upon a cluster
of other capacities. Some of these capacities may be present
without enough of them to constitute the ability to form relationships. As mentioned, Korsgaard’s discussion of pain, the
recognition of pain, and the expression of pain (which clearly
does not require human language) gives us some material here.
Another important example is what MacIntyre calls the, “…
conceptual capacity that makes language possible, what Heidegger calls “the as-structure”” (MacIntyre 1999, 46). The “asstructure” is the ability to conceptualize one’s environment in
such a way as to be able to recognize certain entities in it as
distinct things, or kinds of things. MacIntyre attributes this capacity to dogs, higher primates, and dolphins, although lower
animals of various kinds may lack it. This capacity is important
in relationships because it allows, say, dogs to recognize their
humans. Without the as-structure, any “relationship” would be
a one-way street so to speak. But it is not clear that this capacity
is a necessary condition of having an obligating special relationship. For example, elderly parents or grandparents stricken
by Alzheimer’s may not be able to recognize their family members in any significant way (Bernstein 1997, 56). Even so, we
still take ourselves to have an obligating relationship with our
parent or grandparent. This capacity in non-human animals is
weaker than in humans. Non-human animals cannot, for example, classify things in metaphysical categories and recognize
them as belonging to such categories, among other limitations
(MacIntyre 1999, 47). This does not mean, however, that the
as-structure is missing altogether. With it, non-human animals,
to use a previous example, are able to be distressed at the absence of their humans and joyed at their return.
The capacities that give non-human animals the capacity for
relationships, and this capacity itself, obligate humans in a gen-
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eral rather than a special way. As obligating in a general way,
they impose moral obligations on all beings capable of having
moral obligations. In Kagan’s terms, they are “owed by everyone to everyone…” (Kagan 1998, 127). So my account aims to
explain both types of moral obligations we owe to non-human
animals in themselves. Perhaps there are further reasons for
believing we have moral obligations to non-human animals
(and other non-rational beings). If so, I welcome them. Giving
non-human animals as robust moral status as plausible (taking
differences among different species into account) is a muchneeded antidote to the many centuries of anthropocentrism we
have inflicted upon them.

References
Ashford, Elizabeth and Mulgan, Tim. 2018. “Contractualism.”
In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractualism/
Bernstein, Mark. 1997. “Contractualism and Animals.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. 86: 49-72.
Kagan Shelly. 1998. Normative Ethics. Boulder: Westview
Press.
Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. “The Origin of Value and the
Scope of Obligation.” In: The Sources of Normativity, edited by Onora O’Neill, 131-166. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1999. Dependent Rational Animals: Why
Human Beings Need the Virtues. Chicago: Open Court.

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 24, Issue 1

165
Benjamin Elmore

Scanlon, T.M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Harvard:
Belknap Press.
–– 2017. “Contractualism and Justification.” Citations are from
the unpublished version. The paper is also forthcoming
in Themes from Scanlon. Ed. Stepanians, M. Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2021.
Talbert, Matthew. 2006. “Contractualism and Our Duties to
Nonhuman Animals.” Environmental Ethics. 28: 201-215.

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 24, Issue 1

